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Defending Breakthrough Innovation: The History
and Future of State Patent Law
Max Stul Oppenheimer

I. Introduction
Congress, while enacting at least six major revisions to patent law since 1793, has left the
definition of patentable subject matter essentially unchanged. The Supreme Court, on the other
hand, has been uncomfortable with the concept for more than a century. Despite this longstanding discomfort, it has struggled to advance a theoretical basis for its concern. In a series of
recent cases, it has finally developed a theory as to why certain types of inventions, although
embraced by the statutory definition, are nonetheless unpatentable. The theory, in effect,
abandons the federal government’s role in protecting those inventions. This article explores the
consequences of the resulting vacuum and challenges the conventional wisdom that patents are
purely federal and purely statutory.
Part II of this article traces the history of the statutory concept of patentable subject matter and
the judicial efforts to narrow this definition. Part III of this article reviews the current Supreme
Court theory. Part IV analyzes the consequences of that theory from a federalism perspective and
argues that, by creating a federal vacuum, the Court has opened the door for state patent laws.
Part V outlines how certain states can take advantage of this opening and deals with some
anticipated objections to this proposal.
II. Patent Theory and History
A. The Economic Role of Patents
Patents are, in essence, government-sanctioned monopolies.1 They existed in 18th century
1

The Supreme Court has held that
A patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly . . . . The term ‘monopoly’ connotes the giving of
an exclusive privilege for . . . a thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus a
monopoly takes something from the people. An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it
enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum
of human knowledge.
United States v. Dubilier Condenser, 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933). However, a U.S. patent gives its owner the right to
stop others from making, using, selling, or importing the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). Violation
of this right gives rise to damages and (subject to equitable considerations) injunctions. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012);
eBay, Inc., v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). It is therefore a challenge to competition, even if not
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England,2 and were granted by both colonial state governments and states under the Articles of
Confederation.3 In Thomas Jefferson’s words, they were intended to provide an incentive for
“things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.”4
Inventors have two options for profiting from their work: they can keep the work confidential
and rely on trade secret protection, or they can commercialize the work publicly. Confidential
commercialization is often an attractive option for innovators. As long as the requirements for
trade secrecy are met, 5 a trade secret may be maintained indefinitely and competitors may be
prevented from using the trade secret information to compete.6

“accurately speaking” a monopoly, and the Court has certainly noted the tension between patent rights and antitrust
concerns. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1966).
2
Early English patents were monopolies on existing articles, granted as royal favors. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1829); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
1, 12 (1994). By the time of the American Revolution the system had been changed by the decision in Darcy v.
Allein, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b., (invalidating a patent granted by Queen Elizabeth I on
playing cards) and by the Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.), both of which invalidated “royal
favor” patents but allowed patents awarded to an inventor.
3
South Carolina had a general patent statute which provided: “The Inventors of useful machines shall have a like
exclusive privilege of making or vending their machines for the like term of fourteen years, under the same
privileges and restrictions hereby granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books.” An Act for the Encouragement
of Arts and Sciences, 1784 S.C. Pub. L. 343–44 (1784). Georgia, Act of February 3, 1786, for the Encouragement of
Literature and Genius, and New Hampshire, Act of November 7, 1783, for the Encouragement of Literature and
Genius, had intellectual property statutes broad enough to cover both copyrights and patents. Article II of the
Articles of Confederation reserved to the states all rights not expressly granted to the national government and there
are records confirming that several states made use of that right: a 1780 Pennsylvania patent for a process for
tanning, Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, Vol. 10, p. 132 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders
eds., 1904); a 1786 South Carolina patent for waterworks useful in producing rice, Statutes at Large of South
Carolina, Vol. 4, 755 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1838); Statutes at Large of South Carolina, Vol. 5, 69 (Thomas Cooper
ed., 1839); a 1787 Maryland patent for a cotton and wool carding machine, Laws of Maryland, Vol. 2, Session of
Nov. 6, 1786–Jan. 20, 1787, 23 (William Kilty ed., 1800); and a 1787 Pennsylvania patent for a flour mill device,
Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, Vol. 12, 483–84 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds.).
The right to grant patents was not among the rights granted to the national government, leaving the power with the
states.
4
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Former U.S. President, to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813),
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib020976.
5
The requirements for trade secrecy are that the information sought to be protected derives value from not being
generally known to, or readily ascertainable by proper means by, others who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and that the owner take reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §
1(4). A public disclosure, such as occurs when a patent is published, would therefore destroy it by making it “readily
ascertainable”.
6
Id. Thomas Duston & Thomas Ross, Intellectual Property for Trade Secrets and Know-How, IPO ASS’N,
http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/IP_Protection_for_Trade_Secrets_and_Know-how1076598753.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2016). The requirements for maintaining a trade secret are solely that valuable confidential
information is not publicly known and the owner is taking reasonable steps are taken to maintain its confidentiality –
there is no time limit.
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Most states recognize reverse engineering of a publicly sold product as beyond the protection of
trade secret law.7 Thus, products that inherently reveal such secrets are difficult to commercialize
while maintaining trade secrecy. However, there are technologies of extreme value that can be
commercialized without providing a product that can be reverse-engineered. For example, if an
inventor devises a process or machine that makes it cheaper to produce an existing product, it is
possible to keep the means of production as a trade secret while profiting through the sale of the
end product. Aided by provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, computer software
can be sold without disclosing its secrets by selling only executable code or by providing
services, like cloud computing or smartphone applications, which utilize the software. In this
way, many valuable inventions lend themselves to commercialization without surrendering trade
secrecy.
Public commercialization, on the other hand, is of greater benefit to society because it allows
others to learn from the invention and build upon it.8 Public disclosure, however, irrevocably
surrenders the invention’s trade secrets.9 Thus, without some other form of protection,
competitors who learn the invention’s secrets through disclosure could make use of them without
expending the time and money that the innovator spent to develop them. In economic terms, this
would give the competitor a pricing advantage, because the competitor would not need to
recover research and development costs. This reduces the incentive to innovate.10
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution recognizes this tension between private and
public interests and authorizes Congress to provide a substitute for trade secret protection. By
authorizing the right to exclude competitors from the use of an innovation for a limited time in
exchange for disclosing how to make and use the innovation in a patent application,11 the
Intellectual Property Clause offers compensation for the loss of trade secret rights,12 thus
7

See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act prohibits
acquisition of trade secrets by improper means. Misappropriation may be enjoined or give rise to damages. UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2(a) and 3(a). Misappropriation is defined as “acquisition of a trade secret of another by a
person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means.” Id. § 1(2)(i).
8
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“[T]he primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is ’to promote the progress of science and useful arts . . .
.’”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502, 511 (1917).
9
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.
10
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 486.
11
35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112 (2012).
12
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a “trade secret” as:
[I]nformation . . . that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (emphasis added) and provides remedies, including damages, for
misappropriation of trade secrets. Id. § 3. Issued patents, and some unissued patent applications, are published,
thereby destroying the associated trade secrets by making them generally known and as a failure to make reasonable
efforts to maintain their secrecy. In return for the destruction of the trade secrets contained in the patent, the federal
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increasing the incentive to not only innovate, but also to share that innovation and thereby assist
other innovators.
Disclosure is thought to benefit society more than maintaining a trade secret, because disclosure
permits more people to use the information as a starting point for further innovation.13
An inventor:
may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its
disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted. . . .
[U]pon the expiration of [the patent], the knowledge of the invention inures to the
people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use.14
The compensation offered by the Intellectual Property Clause and the resultant incentives apply
to only those categories of innovation that Congress decides to protect pursuant to constitutional
authorization. Other categories of innovation will not be incentivized. As a result, these
unprotected categories are less likely to be disclosed; those technologies that cannot be
commercialized without disclosure may even fail to get the funding necessary for their
development.15
Thus, a U.S. patent may be thought of as a bargain—an exchange of a federally granted
monopoly with a limited term in return for the surrender of trade secret rights in confidential
information beneficial to the promotion of progress in the useful arts and sciences.
B. Pre-Constitutional History
Patents existed both in 18th century England and in the colonies.
The earliest English patents bore little resemblance to today’s patents, other than granting
exclusive rights. These patents were a way to reward friends of the crown (at no cost to the

patent statue grants a limited monopoly by creating a right to prevent infringement of the patent, 35 U.S.C. § 271
and the right to obtain monetary damages for infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
13
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring).
14
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933).
15
One important industry that exists only because of the availability of patent protection is the pharmaceutical
industry. A widely-cited estimate of the cost of developing a new drug is $2.6 billion. Rick Mullin, Tufts Study
Finds Big Rise in Cost of Drug Development, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://cen.acs.org/articles/92/web/2014/11/Tufts-Study-Finds-Big-Rise.html. An industry aphorism states that it
costs $999,999,999 to produce the first tablet and $1 to produce the second. Drug pricing must spread the
development cost over subsequent sales, leading to prices well above the incremental cost or production. If a
competitor could await an innovator’s development of a new drug and simply copy it without incurring development
costs, the competitor would not need to build those costs into its pricing and it is doubtful that any company would
ever develop a new drug.
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monarch)16 by granting the exclusive right to manufacture a particular article or carry on a
specific trade, thereby guaranteeing the grantee monopoly prices by eliminating competition.
They were usually not related to any role that the grantee had played in inventing the article or
establishing the trade.17 A classic example was Queen Elizabeth I’s grant of the exclusive right to
manufacture playing cards, which was challenged and invalidated in Darcy v. Allein.18 The 1623
Statute of Monopolies19 put an end to such patents. Both the Darcy case and the Statute of
Monopolies were careful to distinguish, however, between “royal favor” patents, which were
invalidated, and patents granted for inventing (or being the first to import) a new technology,
which remained valid.
It was the post-Statute of Monopolies concept of patents that applied in the colonies. However,
patents do not appear to have been common during the colonial period. Several colonial patents
are identified in Goldstein v. California,20 but it is difficult to find any record of patent litigation
preceding the Constitution.21
The Articles of Confederation reserved to the states all rights not expressly granted to the
national government.22 The right to grant patents was not among the rights granted to the
national government, leaving the power with the states.23 This resulted in differing levels of
protection. For example, South Carolina enacted a general patent statute which stated, “The
Inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of making or vending their
machines for the like term of fourteen years, under the same privileges and restrictions hereby
granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books,”24 while both Georgia25 and New Hampshire26
enacted general intellectual property statutes broad enough to cover patents. In contrast,
Maryland27 and North Carolina28 had constitutional provisions dating to 1776 that appear to
16

It is interesting that the United States patent system adopted a similar approach to incentivizing innovation. Rather
than pay for rewards out of government funds, both systems shift the expense to the marketplace by foreclosing
competition, thereby allowing the holder of a patent to obtain a reward by charging monopoly prices.
17
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1829); Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 12.
18
Darcy v. Allein, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b.
19
Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.).
20
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557 n.13 (1973).
21
Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 16. Even under the first patent statute under the Constitution, few patents were
granted. In the three years of operation under the 1790 statute, fifty-five patents were issued. In contrast, in 2015, the
most recent year for which statistics are available, 578,802 utility patents were issued. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart,
Calendar Years 1963 - 2014, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm
22
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. II.
23
Id.
24
An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, 1784 S.C. Pub. Laws 343–44 (1784).
25
Act of February 3, 1786, for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius, reprinted in ROBERT ATKIN ET AL., A
DIGEST OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 323 (1800).
26
Act of November 7, 1783, for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius (repealed 1842).
27
The Maryland Declaration of Rights declared that “monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free
government, and the principles of commerce; and ought not to be suffered.” MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIX.
28
The North Carolina Constitution provided that “perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free
State, and ought not to be allowed.” N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIII.

5

prohibit the grant of patents.
C. The Constitution
The problems facing an inventor under the Articles of Confederation would have tracked the
general problems facing the country under the Articles. Competition between almost-sovereign
states and a lack of uniform laws would have hampered enforcement of patent rights just as they
hampered development of a strong national economy. State-by-state patent rights meant
enforcement was limited to comparatively small markets.29 As James Madison noted, “The
States cannot separately make effectual provision for either [patents or copyrights].”30
The Intellectual Property Clause31 emerged from the Constitutional Convention, but little is
known about how the clause was drafted or what the drafters intended.32 James Madison did
comment in The Federalist that the “utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law.
The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.”33
The first indication that the Convention was concerned about protection of intellectual property
appears in the records of August 18, 1787, when it was proposed that the federal government
have the power “[t]o encourage . . . the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries . . .
[and] [t]o grant patents for useful inventions.”34 The proposal was referred to the Grand
Committee of Eleven in that form on August 31, 1787.35 The patent language, in particular,

29

This is perhaps the reason why Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 1–2, was unable to find any record of patent
litigation before the adoption of the Constitution.
30
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 at 222 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James McClellan ed., 2001).
31
Article I, Section 8, Clause 2, gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32
No delegate to the Constitutional Convention has left any record concerning the interpretation or meaning placed
on the intellectual property clause by the delegates themselves.” Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created
Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1995). See generally
Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 31–34; see also Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative
Power: the Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1141
(2000) and cases collected in Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through Condemnation: Is New London the
Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 472–79 (2007) [hereinafter Oppenheimer I]. A
compelling argument for this lack of interest is offered by Edward C. Walterscheid: “the delegates were tired [and]
wanted to go home . . . .” Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26.
33
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 30, at 222.
34
James Madison, Journal Saturday August 18. 1787, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
321, 321–22 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937); see also Kevin D. Galbraith, Note, Forever on the Installment Plan?
An Examination of the Constitutional History of the Copyright Clause and Whether the Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998 Squares with the Founders’ Intent, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1119, 1140 (2002).
35
The Grand Committee of Eleven comprised one member from each state except Rhode Island and New York,
which did not have delegates present at the time. See Galbraith, supra note 34, at 1136.
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appears to have been added in committee with no record of who made the addition or why.36 On
September 5, 1787, the Committee of Eleven presented the Intellectual Property Clause to the
Convention in its final form,37 and on September 12, the Committee of Stile and Arrangement
presented the Constitution, including the clause, to the Convention. On September 17, the clause
was approved unanimously without debate or any other record of why the interim language
changes were made.38
D. The Legislative Creation of the Statutory Subject Matter Requirement
Whatever the reason for the inclusion of the Intellectual Property Clause or the particular
language chosen at the Constitutional Convention, Congress exercised the power promptly. The
Patent Act of 1790 was passed in the second term of Congress’ first session,39 and it created a
committee,40 which had the power to grant patents to anyone who “hath . . . invented or
discovered any useful art, manufacture, . . . or device, or any improvement therein not before
known or used . . . if [any two members] shall deem the invention or discovery sufficiently
useful and important.”41 Statutory subject matter42 thus originally consisted of art,43
manufactures, and devices.
The meaning of statutory subject matter lies at the heart of the patent system. Although there is
no statutory basis for elevating any requirement over others, some courts have viewed statutory

36

Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American Patent System, 71 AM. SCI. 500, 500 (1983)
(“The absence of debate over the patent provision . . . has been taken as proof of their firm belief in patents as the best
way to encourage socially beneficial innovation. However, it is more likely that the authors of the Constitution simply
followed the English precedent without paying much attention to the subject, since they were also faced with the larger
problems of how to structure the government, solve its fiscal difficulties, and defend the new nation.”).
37
See Galbraith, supra note 34, at 1140.
38
Id. at 1140–41. On September 12, the Committee of Stile and Arrangement reported to the full Convention the
entire Constitution, which contained the clause with the language unchanged from the September 5 version. Id. On
September 17, the Constitution was adopted and signed by the delegates, and there was no recorded debate of the
Copyright Clause. Id. See also Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26.
39
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
40
The committee was composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Department of War, and the Attorney
General. See id. at 109–10. The composition of the committee, and the other demands on the time of cabinet
members, may in part explain why only 47 patents were issued in the three years the statute was in effect. U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY CALENDAR YEARS 1790 TO PRESENT (2016),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.pdf.
41
§ 1, 1 Stat. at 110.
42
Statutory subject matter refers to the types of inventions which may be patented. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
182 (1981). Additional requirements limit which of these types of inventions may in fact be granted a patent, but no
invention may be patented which is not within the definition of statutory subject matter. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (“[N]o patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious,
unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”).
43
At the time of enactment of the 1790 statute, “art” meant “process” (the term used in the current statute). Diehr,
450 U.S. at 182–84 (holding that the 1952 statutory change from “art” to “process” was simply a modernization of
the eighteenth century terminology).
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subject matter as a “gatekeeper.”44 It is, if nothing more, a reflection of Congress’s policy
decision as to what types of inventions may be patented and thereby incentivized. Other
countries have created technology-specific exclusions from patentability, with the most common
being computer software and biotechnology, industries in which U.S. companies hold dominant
positions and which are major contributors to the U.S. economy.45 Congress has likewise shown
itself capable of providing technology-specific exceptions when it chooses to do so, but it has
limited these exceptions to the relatively economically unimportant markets of nuclear
weaponry, tax strategies, and medical procedures.46
The current definition of statutory subject matter is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which lists four
categories of statutory subject matter that may be patented: machines, manufactures,
compositions of matter, and processes.47
While the 1790 statute did not include “compositions of matter,” contemporary English
precedent would have included it within the term “manufacture.”48 Likewise, the 1790 statute did
not use the word “process,” but contemporary precedent would have included it in the term
“art.”49
44

See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), withdrawn and superseded on rehearing en banc by
No. 2006-1286, 2009 WL 68845 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and opinion revised and superseded by 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.
2009); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (§ 101 is
a threshold issue that must be addressed before other questions of patentability), abrogated sub nom. In re Bilski,
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“The first door which
must be opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101.”), vacated in part sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
45
See Kimberly Amadeo, Components of GDP: Explanation, Formula and Chart, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/components-of-gdp-explanation-formula-and-chart-3306015 (last updated Oct. 28,
2016); Robert Carlson, Estimating the Biotech Sector’s Contribution to the US Economy, 34 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 247-55 fig. 4 (2016); The Bloomberg Innovation Index, BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-innovative-countries/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2016). For examples of
exclusions from patentability in other countries, see Oppenheimer I, supra note 32, at 454 nn.36–37.
46
See Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents, Taxes, and the Nuclear Option: Do We Need a “Tax Strategy Patent” Ban
Treaty?, 1 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 28 (2008); James R. Newman and Byron S. Miller, The Control of Atomic Energy:
A Study of Its Social, Economic, and Political Implications (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948); John Raidt, Patents
and Biotechnology, U.S. CHAMBER COM. FOUND., https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/patents-and-biotechnology
(last visited Nov. 14, 2016) (discussing the “narrowly tailored” exemption provided to medical procedures and its
application). Tax strategy patents and claims “directed to or encompassing a human organism” are specifically
excluded from patentability. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 14, 33, 125 Stat. 284, 327–
28 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). Nuclear weapons technology is likewise excluded from patentability.
42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2012). In addition, Congress has denied remedies for infringement of medical procedure patents.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2012).
47
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The list is exhaustive.
“[N]o patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the
express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .” Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 483.
48
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring).
49
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1853) (“[A] process, eo nomine, is not made the subject of a patent in our
act of Congress. It is included under the general term ‘useful art.’”); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88
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The second patent statute, enacted in 1793,50 explicitly added the term “composition of matter”
to the list of statutory subject matter.51 It also established a registration system under which an
applicant needed only to allege having “invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter, not known or used before the application”52 and “present a petition to
the Secretary of State.”53 The Secretary of State was authorized to issue a patent without any
examination of the validity of the applicant’s allegations,54 leaving issues of validity to the court
system and subsequent litigation.55
Thus, the 1793 definition of statutory subject matter remained unchanged until 195256 when
Congress replaced the word “art” with “process” and defined the term “process,”57 changes that
were not meant to change the definition substantively.58

(1876) (“A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. . . . If new and useful, it is
just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art.”); Tilghman v. Proctor,
102 U.S. 707, 722–23 (1880) (“A manufacturing process is clearly an art . . . .”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
184 (1981) (“Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a ‘process’ did not change with the
addition of that term to § 101.”).
50
Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–19 (repealed 1836).
51
The 1793 statute provided:
That when any person . . . being a citizen . . . of the United States, shall allege that he . . . [has]
invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or
used before the application, and shall present a petition to the Secretary of State, . . . it shall and
may be lawful for the said Secretary of State, to cause letters patent to be made out . . . .
Id. at 318–20.
52
Id. The language limits patents to invention not known or used before filing of the application. This must have
been intended to mean “not known or used by others” since clearly the inventor knew of the invention before filing
the application.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
As a result of the lack of examination before issuing patents, “a great number of lawsuits arise, which are daily
increasing in an alarming degree, onerous to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and injurious to society.” Sen. John
Ruggles, Senate Report Accompanying S. 239, 24th Cong. at 3–4 (1st Sess. 1836), reprinted in DONALD CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS app. 12 (Matthew Bender & Co., 2000). The patent statute was amended in 1836 to address
these problems by creating a Patent Office to evaluate patent applications. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117,
119–20.
56
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792. Congress also amended the patent statute in 1836 and 1848, but neither
amendment affected the definition of statutory subject matter. The 1836 amendments were largely directed to
eliminating abuses by establishing a Patent Office to review applications and determine patentability. Patent Act of
1836, ch. 357 5 Stat. 117. The 1848 Act provided for publication of patents. Patent Act of May 27th, 1848, 6 Stat.
231.
57
35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2015).
58
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (“[A] process has historically enjoyed patent protection because it
was considered a form of ‘art’ as that term was used in the 1793 Act.”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980).
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In the most recent major review of the patent statute in 2011, Congress left the definition of
statutory subject matter unchanged. 59
Although there have been at least four major overhauls of the patent statute (instances in which
Congress certainly would have reviewed the definition of statutory subject matter), the current
statutory language differs from the original language in only two respects: the addition of the
category “composition of matter” in 1793 and the change from “art” to “process” in 1952, both
of which have been held to be non-substantive.60
Certainly nothing in the statutory development suggests Congressional intent to exclude laws of
nature, physical phenomena, or abstract ideas from the definition per se.61 In fact, the legislative
history suggests a broad reading of the four categories of statutory subject matter now
59

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 14, 125 Stat. 284, 327–28 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C.
§ 101). The Act created an explicit exception excluding tax strategy inventions from eligibility by amending the
rules for evaluating prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, and established a process for reviewing patentability
of business methods, but did not change the fundamental definition of statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101. Id.
60
While the 1790 statute did not explicitly include “compositions of matter,” this category was, under English
precedent, considered to be within the term “manufacture.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J.,
concurring). Processes, though not mentioned in the 1793 statute, were considered patentable subject matter. In
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1854), the Court held “[a] process, eo nomine, is not made the subject of a
patent in our act of Congress. It is included under the general term ‘useful art.’” In Cochrane v. Deener, the Court
held:
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used,
cannot be disputed. . . . A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and
reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of
machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art.
94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876). In Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 723 (1880), the Court held, “That a patent can
be granted for a process, there can be no doubt. The patent law is not confined to new machines and new
compositions of matter, but extends to any new and useful art or manufacture. A manufacturing process is clearly an
art . . . .” Finally, in Diamond v. Diehr, the 1952 statutory change from “art” to “process” was held as simply
modernizing the eighteenth century term “art” which, in contemporary terminology would have included processes.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). “Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a ‘process’ did not change
with the addition of that term to § 101.” Id. at 184.
61
Other sections of the patent statute place limits on patentability. Under 35 U.S.C. § 111, patent applications must
be submitted in writing, and under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the application must be detailed enough to demonstrate that the
applicant has possession of the invention and can describe how to make and use it. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the
application must demonstrate novelty, while 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires that the claimed invention be non-obvious.
These limits, however, are technology-neutral; they do not preclude patentability of specific types of inventions. See
generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155
(2002) (discussing the technology-neutral theory of patent law in comparison to the technology-specific application
of patent law). Congress has imposed technology-specific statutory exclusions, showing that they are quite capable
of excluding things from patentability when they choose to do so. See id. at 1190–96. These exclusions share no
common theoretical basis—they are simply examples of case-by-case lobbying power. See N. Telecom, Inc. v.
Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing an approach whereby courts would look to the level
of skill in each case to reach a decision).
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enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Yet, the Supreme Court has announced these three exceptions to
the broad language of the statute.62 These exceptions emerged in an ad hoc fashion, leaving
researchers uncertain as to what categories of technology can be protected (and therefore what
research might be justified economically).63
E. The Ad Hoc Development of the Judicial Exceptions to Statutory Subject Matter
Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit has reasonably asked, “why should some categories of
invention deserve no protection?”64 A sufficient, although simplistic, answer is, “because
Congress decided to impose it, and the Constitution gave Congress that power.”
Determining why some categories of invention should be excluded from protection by judicial
exception is a more complicated issue. There are two possible justifications for judicial
introduction of exceptions to the congressional definition of statutory subject matter: (1) the
statute is ambiguous and requires interpretation; or (2) the statute, although clear, must be limited
as a matter of constitutional law.65 The justification matters. If it is merely a matter of ambiguity,
then Congress (and Congress alone) can direct a contrary conclusion; however, if it is
constitutionally mandated, then Congress is without power to overcome the exceptions—and the
power resides with the states.
The development of judicial exceptions has been ad hoc. Each of the three categories of
exceptions developed mostly independently for 150 years before the Court finally offered an
overarching theory as to why these particular exceptions should exist.
Notwithstanding repeated admonitions to the lower courts not to read words into the patent
statute,66 the Court itself has created three exceptions to the clearly established categories of
statutory subject matter in § 101: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.67 The
difficulties in defining the scope of statutory subject matter stem from these three exceptions,
and these exceptions have arguably delayed the development of the software, biotech, and

62

Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187–88; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
63
See Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject Matter and Separation of Powers, 15 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Oppenheimer II].
64
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
65
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). “Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining
patentable subject matter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed. In so doing,
our obligation is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the legislative history and
statutory purpose.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980).
66
The Supreme Court has “more than once cautioned that ‘courts “should not read into the patent laws limitations
and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.”’” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (citations omitted).
67
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Laws of nature “are part of the storehouse of knowledge . . . free to
all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). See also Diehr, 450
U.S. at 187–88; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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nanotechnology industries.68 The Court’s particular intervention disincentivizes innovation and
runs counter to the constitutional mandate to promote progress because withdrawing patent
protection withdraws the incentive to disclose.
The Court had addressed the issue of statutory subject matter directly69 and tangentially70 more
than a dozen times.
1) Scientific Principles and Ideas
The Court’s exploration of the meaning of “statutory subject matter” began with a series of
decisions in the 1850s.71 The Court opined that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them
an exclusive right”72 and that “[i]t is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or
means of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for the result or
effect itself.”73
The Court explained the distinction between understanding a scientific principle and finding a
use for the principle in O’Reilly v. Morse,74 the 1853 case determining the scope of patentability
of Samuel Morse’s telegraph. Morse had claimed his invention in several ways: (1) as “a process
of using electromagnetism to produce distinguishable signs for telegraphy;”75 (2) as a “system of
signs, consisting of dots, spaces, and horizontal lines, for numerals, letters, words, or sentences,
substantially as herein set forth and illustrated, for telegraphic purposes;”76 and (3) as “the use of
the motive power of the electro or galvanic current, which [he] call[ed] electro-magnetism,
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any
distances.”77 The Court found the first two formulations of the invention patentable and the third
unpatentable, distinguishing between patentable specific uses of electromagnetism and
68

See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions after Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 59–60
(2011).
69
See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Lab. Corp.
of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124 (2006); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972);
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
306 U.S. 86 (1939); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1891); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880); RubberTip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (1874); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S.
62 (1853).
70
See, e.g., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178
(1933).
71
In 1853, as now, the patent statute required that the invention for which a patent was sought must be “useful.”
Section 1(a), Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (July 4, 1836)
72
Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175. Of course, the court’s holding is a tautology.
73
Corning, 56 U.S. at 268.
74
O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113.
75
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (citing O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 111).
76
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77
O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 62.
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unpatentable claims to the use of magnetism as a motive power without specifying how it was
used.78 The Court rejected the third formulation, because it attempted to claim something that
Morse had not invented and could not describe.79 As the Court observed, “[f]or aught that we
now know some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of
writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any
part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff's specification.”80 Under today’s
statute, this same concern raises a possible written description deficiency under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
In 1874, the Court declared that “an idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it
may be made practically useful is.”81 The idea at issue was the creation of a small hole in a
rubber eraser meant to allow the eraser to fit on the end of a pencil.82 The Court viewed this as an
unpatentable “idea that if a pencil is inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber smaller than itself
the rubber will attach itself to the pencil, and when so attached become convenient for use as an
eraser”83 – in other words, no more than a recognition of the scientific principle that rubber can
be stretched around an object and, when released, will contract and grip the object.
In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, the Court was tasked with
determining the patentability of a claim for a radio antenna produced according to a previously
known formula.84 The Court assumed that the patent claim covered an invention and was valid,85
but it nonetheless stated in dictum that “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression
of it, is not patentable, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of
scientific truth may be.”86
While irrelevant to the resolution of the case before the Court, and supported by no citation of
authority, this dictum laid the foundation for the Court’s first general exclusion from patentable
78

Id. at 112–13.
“In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not
invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent. The court is of opinion that the claim is too
broad, and not warranted by law.” Id. at 113.
80
Id.
81
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 98–99 (1939).
Carter [the applicant] did not invent the formula. It had been . . . published in a scientific journal
thirty years before. . . . [and] expressed the scientific truth that when radio activity is projected
from a charged wire of finite length, i.e., one having standing waves, and having a length of a
multiple of half wave lengths, the angle between the direction of the principal radio activity and
the wire is dependent on wave length and wire length, which is a multiple of half wave lengths. . .
. It is plain, therefore, that the Carter invention, if it was invention, consisted in taking the angle of
the Abraham formula as the angle between each wire of the V antenna and its bisector.
Id. at 93–94 (emphasis added).
85
Id. at 94 (“We assume, without deciding the point, that this advance was invention even though it was achieved by
the logical application of a known scientific law to a familiar type of antenna.”).
86
Mackay, 306 U.S. at 94
79
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statutory subject matter: scientific principles.87
2) Laws of Nature
The second exclusion from patentable statutory subject matter—laws of nature—was announced
in 1948 in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant.88 The technology at issue in that case involved
a bacterial inoculant. Farmers had previously used several different inoculants depending on the
type of crop they were growing, because they believed they needed to apply each inoculant
separately because of mutual inhibition.89 The patent applicant had found that several inoculants
could coexist and therefore be applied in a one-step mixture and claimed the mixture.90 In
holding the invention unpatentable, the Court chose an expansive rationale—that a combination
of naturally occurring inoculants was a product of nature and therefore unpatentable, even
though a narrower ground of decision was available.91 The Court cited no evidence that the
claimed combination occurred naturally.92 The Court held that “[h]e who discovers a hitherto
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly. . . . If there is to be invention from
such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful
end.”93 The Court did not find that the “invention” constituted advancement over what already
existed in nature:
The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six
species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. . . . They
serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite independently of any effort
of the patentee.94 . . . The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun,
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of
all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.95

87

Compare id., with Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1880).
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
89
Id. at 129–30.
90
Id. at 130.
91
Concurring in the result, Justice Frankfurter preferred to reach it on enablement grounds rather than limiting the
definition of statutory subject matter. In his view,
[i]t only confuses the issue...to introduce such terms as ‘the work of nature’ and the ‘laws of
nature.’ For these are vague and malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and
equivocation. Everything that happens may be deemed ‘the work of nature,’ and any patentable
composite exemplifies in its properties ‘the laws of nature.’
Id. at 134–35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Instead, he would have found the claim unpatentable because “the strains
that Bond put together in the product which he patented can be specified only by the properties of the mixture” and
therefore failed the enablement requirement. Id.
92
Id. at 130.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 131.
95
Id. at 130.
88

14

The conclusion that “manifestations of laws of nature” were “free to all men” established the
second judicial exemption from the legislative definition of statutory subject matter.96
3) Mathematical Algorithms and Abstract Ideas
In 1972, the Court established the “abstract ideas” exception to patentable statutory subject
matter when it faced a patent application that claimed a process for converting numbers from
binary coded decimal format to the binary format used by digital computers.97 The Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson held that a claim to a computer-implemented method of converting
numbers was not a patentable invention under § 101.98 Because the method had “no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital computer,” it was not limited to a
specific use and therefore amounted to nothing more than an unpatentable mathematical
algorithm.99 The Court stated that such a mathematical formula was simply an abstract idea, akin
to unpatentable phenomena of nature and abstract concepts.100 The court then summarized,
“[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”101
Under this theory, the problem with allowing a patent on the invention was that it “wholly preempt[s]” the use of a mathematical formula and therefore was not patentable subject matter.102
The Court recognized pre-emption as a new justification for invalidating the patent (without
engaging in statutory interpretation), describing the claimed mathematical process as “so abstract
and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary
conversion.”103
In Parker v. Flook, the Court clarified that a “process is not unpatentable simply because it
contains a law of nature.”104 The patent at issue included claims to a catalytic conversion process
that involved the use of a formula, which the Court assumed to be novel and useful, to calculate
and update “alarm limits.”105 Drawing on the formulation of Benson, the Court explained that
determining whether a claim containing a mathematical algorithm is statutory subject matter is
not simply a matter of whether the claim “wholly pre-empts” the mathematical algorithm, but
whether “once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as
a whole, contains no patentable invention.”106 Noting that the line between an abstract principle
and the application of that principle is “not always clear,”107 the Court concluded that the process
96

The statutory section at issue in Funk Bros. was § 31, comparable to § 101 of the statute as revised in 1952.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64, 67 (1972) (holding “abstract intellectual concepts” unpatentable).
98
Id. at 71–72.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 67–68.
101
Id.
102
See id. at 71–72.
103
Id. at 68.
104
437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
105
Id. at 586–87.
106
Id. at 594.
107
Id. at 589.
97
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was not statutory subject matter under § 101 since it was merely a mathematical formula, which
was “not the kind of ‘discover[y]’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”108
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,109 the Court noted that Congress plainly contemplated that the
patent laws would be given wide scope:110
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.
Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not
patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are
“manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none”.111 . . .
In Diamond v. Diehr, the applicant claimed a process for making molded rubber products, which
involved monitoring the temperature inside the mold and using a well-known equation to
calculate the required cure time based on the measured temperature.112 While reiterating that an
algorithm or mathematical formula is like a law of nature, which cannot be the subject of a
patent, the Supreme Court held that the claim was valid as “a process of curing synthetic rubber.
Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to
pre-empt the use of that equation.”113
In 2010, the Court attempted to clarify its interpretation of § 101 in Bilski v. Kappos.114 The
applicant claimed a computer-implemented system for hedging risk.115 The patent office and
lower courts had all held the claims were not statutory subject matter under the abstract ideas
exception.116 In affirming, the Court summarized:
Section 101 specifies four independent categories of inventions or discoveries that
are patent eligible . . . “Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would
be given wide scope . . . .” The Court’s precedents provide three specific
exceptions to § 101’s broad principles: “laws of nature, physical phenomena and
108

Id. at 592–93.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
110
The Committee Report accompanying the 1952 Act included a statement that “a person may have ‘invented’ a
machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily
patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.” S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R.
REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). The Court interpreted the language as “inform[ing] us that Congress intended
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’” (first quoting S. REP. NO. 821979, at 5 (1952); and then quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09.
111
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citations omitted).
112
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
113
Id. at 187.
114
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 593–94 (2010).
115
Id. at 593.
116
Id.
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abstract ideas.” While not required by the statutory text, these exceptions are
consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be “new and useful.”
And in any case, the exceptions have defined the statute’s reach as a matter of
statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.117
The Court has thus created three broad exceptions to the statutory language. It has acknowledged
that Congress intended to give patents a wide scope and frequently reminded the lower courts
that “our obligation is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the
legislative history and statutory purpose.”118 It further acknowledged that its exceptions are “not
required by the statutory text.” Yet the Court has nonetheless proceeded to announce ad hoc
exemptions from the unambiguous statutes, without advancing an argument for its power to do
so.
In Patents 101 I argued that the judicially imposed limits on the statutory language were not
constitutionally required and represented an unwarranted judicial intrusion into Congress’ role as
policy maker, in the guise of statutory interpretation.119 The Supreme Court disagreed—
repeatedly.120 In a recent series of cases, the Court finally offered a basis for its authority to
establish these exemptions. In doing so, it opened a new option for protecting breakthrough
inventions.

III. A Theory at Last
The courts, of course, have the power to review and interpret statutes.121 However, the power to
intervene and impose a judicial interpretation on a statute, as the Court has done in the creation
of exceptions to the congressional definition of statutory subject matter, is limited to two
situations.122 That power arises when a statute is ambiguous and requires interpretation123 and it
arises when a statute, although unambiguous, must be limited as a matter of constitutional
constraint.124 Unfortunately, despite repeated review of statutory subject matter cases, the Court
has never explicitly identified which of these sources of its authority it relies on to override the
statutory language regarding patentable subject matter.
117

Id. at 593–94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
118
Chakrabarty 447 U.S. at 313, 315.
119
See Oppenheimer II, supra note 63.
120
See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2012).
121
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
122
There is a third possibility – the Court is simply wrong and has exceeded its authority to undo a Congressional
enactment – which is beyond the scope of this article.
123
See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315 (“Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable subject
matter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed. In so doing, our obligation is
to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the legislative history and statutory purpose.”)
(emphasis added).
124
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
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The source of judicial authority has important consequences. If the Court is acting pursuant to its
power to interpret an ambiguous statute, then Congress (and Congress alone) can determine that
the Court has misunderstood Congress’ intent and correct the erroneous judicial interpretation by
revising the statute. If the Court is acting pursuant to its power to prevent unconstitutional
application of statutory language, then Congress cannot override the Court’s decision – the only
way to change the result is by constitutional amendment.
The next two sections examine the applicability of the two available sources of authority to the
decisions establishing exceptions to the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
A. Possibility #1: Are the Judicial Exceptions an Exercise in Interpretation of Ambiguity?
The language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 does not appear ambiguous on its face. It lists four categories of
statutory subject matter and does not exclude “phenomena of nature, mental processes, or
abstract intellectual concepts.”125 This does not appear to be an oversight on Congress’ part;
Congress has apparently had no difficulty excluding specific types of inventions that would
otherwise fit within the four broad statutory categories. It has done so most recently in the
America Invents Act which explicitly excludes human organisms (which would be compositions
of matter under Chakrabarty) and tax strategies (which would be processes under State Street
Bank) from the scope of Section 101.126
The Supreme Court cautioned in Dubilier,127 and repeated in Chakrabarty, that courts “should
not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed.”128 Chakrabarty itself appears to find the statutory language unambiguous.129
In Bilski v. Kappos, writing for four members of the Court, Justice Kennedy noted that
“precedents provide three specific exceptions to §101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: ‘laws
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas’” but that “these exceptions are not required
by the statutory text.”130
125
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In 150 years of Supreme Court review of patentable subject matter cases, not once has the Court
pointed to an ambiguity in the definition of statutory subject matter or stated that the language
adopted by Congress is unclear or ambiguous.131
If the statute is not ambiguous, there is only one other source of judicial power to create
exceptions to Congress’ definition of patentable subject matter, and language in recent cases
points to this second source of power.
B. Possibility #2: Are the Judicial Exceptions an Exercise of the Power to Find a Statute
Unconstitutional?
The Court has never explicitly been called upon to rule on the constitutionality of § 101.
However, statements in recent cases suggest that that is exactly the basis for imposing exceptions
on the statutory language.
The first hint appeared in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Metabolite, where the Justice argued that the
Court should have reviewed a lower court’s holding of patentability. Justice Breyer invoked
constitutional limits to justify the judiciary’s deviation from the literal language of § 101 as
follows: “the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can impede
rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’”132 The quoted language is, of
course, taken directly from the Preamble to Article I §8 of the Constitution.
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Justice Breyer, now writing for a
unanimous court, applied the same reasoning to hold that a method of optimizing a drug dosage
by administering a dose of the drug to a patient, then testing the patient’s blood and adjusting the
dosage depending on the results133 was not patentable because, although it was a process,134 it
was no more than informing a “relevant audience about certain laws of nature” and therefore not
patentable.135
The same analysis, and the same result, can also be seen in Association for Molecular Pathology,
logic, noting “At points, the opinion suggests that novelty is the clue. . . . But the fact that hedging is ‘long prevalent
in our system of commerce,’ . . . cannot justify the Court’s conclusion”, as “the proper construction of §101 . . . does
not involve . . . novelty.” Id. at 620 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring). In any event, the
theory that the limitations are imposed by another section of the statute, does not appear to have been further
developed or pursued in subsequent cases.
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where the Supreme Court held that a DNA sequence, isolated from the hundreds of millions of
nucleotide sequences in the human genome and useful in diagnostic testing, was not patentable
because, however difficult it was to find and isolate, it had always existed as a product of
nature.136 Again invoking the Constitutional purpose of Art. I Section 8, Justice Thomas wrote
“[a]s the Court has explained, without this exception, there would be considerable danger that the
grant of patents would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit future innovation
premised upon them.’. . . This would be at odds with the very point of patents, which exist to
promote creation”137 and “as we have recognized before, patent protection strikes a delicate
balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery.’”138 The
decision where to strike balances is, of course, committed to Congress. Therefore, although
Justice Thomas does not quote the Constitutional language, the Court must be saying that
Congress’ language is limited by the Constitutional limitation of using the patent laws to
“promote progress” (or, in the Court’s words, “innovation,” “creation,” “invention” or
“discovery”).
Most recently, in Alice v. CLS Bank, Justice Thomas reiterated the theory developed in the above
cases, this time rejecting a patent as claiming “an abstract idea”, and this time citing the
constitutional language139:
We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of pre-emption
. . . the patent “would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively
grant a monopoly over an abstract idea”. Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas are ‘the basic tools of scientific and technological work.’ “[M]onopolization of those
tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend
to promote it,” thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. . . . See U.S. CONST.,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress “shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts”). We have ‘repeatedly emphasized this . . . concern that patent law not inhibit
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of’ these building blocks of human
ingenuity.140
In sum, the current justification supporting exceptions to the statutory language of 35 U.S.C.
§101 is based, not on the need to interpret an ambiguous statute, but rather on the theory first
advanced in the Breyer dissent in Metabolite: “too much patent protection can impede rather than
‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . ’”141 In other words, the Constitution limits
application of the statute. Thus, while the Court has never stated in explicit terms that the
statutory language is broader than the Constitution permits, these decisions can only be based on
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
Id. at 2116.
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the conclusion that, although the clear statutory language142 covers such inventions, laws of
nature, mathematical algorithms, and abstract principles must be excluded because there is no
constitutional power for Congress to authorize such patents.
IV. A Federal Vacuum; a State Opportunity
The patent statute is an exercise of power granted to the federal government by Article I section
8 of the Constitution. Prior to adoption of the Constitution, that power had been held by the
states under the Articles of Confederation. The Court’s exceptions to the statutory language are,
in effect, a determination that the Constitution did not grant Congress the power to protect the
excepted categories of inventions. If the power to grant such patents is denied to the federal
government because it is not granted by the Constitution, then under the Tenth Amendment it
remains with the states, where it resided under the Articles of Confederation.143
Thus, by creating a federal vacuum regarding protection of inventions that fall within the
categories of laws of nature, mathematical algorithms and abstract principles, the Court has
opened the door for states to adopt patent laws144 protecting such inventions.
The question remains whether any other restraint might stand in the way of state patent
protection for the excluded categories of invention. Two legal concerns and one practical
concern must be considered. The legal concerns are whether a state patent system would conflict
with federal antitrust law and whether such a system would violate the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. The practical concern is whether state patent protection could be implemented,
or whether potential infringers would easily avoid liability by locating infringing activities
outside the state.
A. Coexisting with Antitrust Laws
An initial objection might be that state patent rights would be inconsistent with federal antitrust
laws. Even federally granted patent laws must be reconciled with “this Nation's deep-seated
antipathy to monopolies.”145
However, even Thomas Jefferson, whose anti-monopoly credentials were unmatched, was
willing to concede that monopolies had a role in situations where it was necessary to provide
“the embarrassment of an exclusive patent” for things of worth.”146
142
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The decision to make patent rights exclusive (whether denominated monopolies or not) is
consistent with antitrust laws that had already been made. As the Supreme Court has observed,
[a] patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly. . . . The term ‘monopoly’
connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for ... something that the public
freely enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus a monopoly takes something from the
people. An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his
discovery.147
Thus, as long as a state system included requirements similar to the federal novelty and
obviousness standards, it would not be a monopoly within the definition the Supreme Court has
established. The resulting question is not whether patent rights can coexist with antitrust laws - it
is whether the federal government has exclusive domain over granting those rights or whether
states can also grant such rights.
The answer to that question (and the supremacy objection) turns in part on pre-Constitutional
history.
Until the adoption of the Constitution, patents were granted by states.148 The Tenth Amendment
reserves all powers not expressly delegated to the federal government by the Constitution as state
powers. Supreme Court decisions indicate that granting patent rights was not designated to the
federal government with respect to certain subject matter: laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas.
For this reason, the basis for the Supreme Court restrictions on patentable subject matter plays a
crucial role. If the Court were simply interpreting the Patent Act, there would be a compelling
argument that the Constitution had completely removed the power to grant patents from the
states, assigned it to the federal government, and Congress had simply decided not to exercise
the power to grant patents with respect to certain categories of invention.149 However, if “laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and ideas” are not patentable because they are “the basic tools of

The patent statute is not the only example of federally granted exclusive rights. For example, the Food and Drug
Administration in effect grants exclusive rights to the first applicant to present a successful application for approval
of a New Chemical Entities by refusing to approve additional applications for a limited period of time. 21 C. F. R.
Section 314.108 - New drug product exclusivity.
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Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 14, 33, 125 Stat. 284, 327–28 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 101). Nuclear
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scientific and technological work”150 and therefore beyond the patent-granting power bestowed
by the Constitution,151 then the power to grant patents as to these inventions was not taken from
the states.152
The only remaining inquiry is whether granting patents for laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas was a power that the states had prior to the Constitution153 – and the answer is
“yes.”
Patents were issued before the Revolutionary War in England and in the colonies.154 In postRevolutionary United States, the Articles of Confederation left the power to grant patents with
the states155 and at least one state clearly exercised that power by enacting a general patent
statute.156 New Hampshire and Georgia enacted intellectual property statutes that were broad
enough to include the power to grant patents.157 Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Maryland
issued patents under the Articles of Confederation.158
The power thus existed as a state right under the Articles of Confederation and was not
completely transferred to the federal government by the Constitution.
B. Surviving the Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause raises a related but separate hurdle for a state-granted patent rights
system.
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Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 159
The “notwithstanding” phrase “is a non obstante provision... and instructed courts not to apply
the general presumption against implied repeals.... The non obstante provision in the Supremacy
Clause therefore suggests that federal law should be understood to impliedly repeal conflicting
state law.”160 Thus, state laws that conflict with federal law are void.161
The Supreme Court has recognized three types of preemption:
First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt
state law. . . . and when Congress has made its intent known through explicit
statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one.
Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted
where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal
Government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a
“scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” or where an
Act of Congress “touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject” although “where . . . the field which Congress is said to have preempted includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the States,
congressional intent to supersede state laws must be ‘clear and manifest.’”
Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private
party to comply with both state and federal requirements. . . . or where state law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”162
A) Explicit Preemption
Nothing in the Intellectual Property Clause163 (or any other clause of the Constitution) explicitly
forbids states from granting patent rights.
159
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The Intellectual Property Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”164 There has been debate as to whether the preamble
(“to promote the Progress...”) is a limitation on Congress’s power or serves some other purpose.
The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.”165 The
purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause is twofold:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit . . . . [They are] intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors . . . and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control
has expired.166
The Intellectual Property Clause does not explicitly restrict any state action and does not prohibit
the federal government from using extra-patent measures to “Promote the Progress.” Indeed, the
federal government routinely funds programs also designed to improve science and useful arts.
For example, the National Institutes of Health provides grants for medical research; the
Advanced Research Project Administration provides grants for emerging technology research;
and the National Institute for Standards and Technologies funds technological innovation.
B) Exclusive Occupancy Preemption
“[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates
conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively.”167
Congress has clearly left areas of intellectual property law to the states. For instance, state
trademark law coexists with federal trademark law. State trade secret law functions alongside
federal patent law.168
There are provisions of federal statutes other than the Intellectual Property Clause, which may
indicate that Congress meant to regulate patents. For example, a jurisdictional statute appears to
confer exclusive federal judicial jurisdiction over patent matters.169 That statute, however, could
be read to confer exclusive federal judicial jurisdiction over cases involving federal patents. Such
164
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an interpretation would leave state judicial jurisdiction over state trademark and trade secret
issues and cases involving state patent rights, because “[wh]ere . . . the field which Congress is
said to have pre-empted includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the States,
congressional intent to supersede state laws must be ‘clear and manifest.’”170
States were the source of patents granted prior to the Constitution.171 Unlike the most recent
copyright statute, where Congress clearly pre-empted the entire field with respect to newly
created works of authorship, Congress has taken no steps to indicate a similar interest in
regulating the patentability of “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and ideas,” notwithstanding
the Supreme Court’s focus on this area of patentable subject matter.
Finally, if the Constitution did not grant Congress the power to extend federal patent protection
to “laws of nature, natural phenomena and ideas” then that power remained with the states,
where it had existed under the Articles of Confederation172 - and there can be no “exclusive
occupancy preemption” where Congress has no right to occupancy to begin with.
C) Conflict Preemption
The third category of federal preemption is conflict preemption: a state law is preempted if it
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”173
In Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft, the Court noted, “efficient operation of the federal patent
system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented design and
utilitarian conceptions.”174 However, the Court also noted an appropriate role for state regulation
of unpatented designs if “necessary to promote goals outside the contemplation of the federal
patent scheme.”175 If an area is beyond Congress’ constitutional power (and reserved to the
states), then state regulation in that area is by definition “outside the contemplation of the federal
patent scheme.”176
Congress’s objective, as expressed in the Patent Act, is to provide patent protection for four
categories of statutory subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of
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matter.177 “[T]he powers of Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary”178 and
Congress has the “constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter.”179
It is the Supreme Court—not Congress—that has imposed limitations on the clear statutory
language. These are limitations that the Court views as compelled by constitutional limits on
Congressional power in the field. State patent rights would therefore be consistent with the
Congressional goal of filling a gap created by the Court’s view of the limits of the legislature’s
power. As such, the grant of state patent rights would not violate federal preemption.
V. A Model for State Patents
A. The Opportunity for States
The theory underlying the Supreme Court cases appears to be that some ideas (i.e. principles of
nature) are so far-reaching that patent law cannot allow inventors to monopolize them.180 The
rationale finds its most coherent expression in Justice Breyer’s dissent to the dismissal of
certiorari in Lab Corp.181 In that dissent, Justice Breyer explains that the problem is not that laws
of nature are easy, inexpensive, or obvious to discover, but rather that allowing them to be
patented grants too much protection and thereby impedes the exchange of information and
discourages research.182
Stated differently, breakthrough innovations are too important to patent. Even if the federal
government is bound by this conclusion, states might well conclude that breakthrough
177
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innovations present tremendous potential and should be encouraged - and capitalized: arguably,
the greater the discovery, the greater the value derived from its disclosure.
In a sense, the same argument advanced by the Supreme Court (that judicial exceptions are
necessary to prevent monopolization of emerging technologies) is a stronger argument for the
opposite conclusion. For instance, emerging technologies are riskier investments than established
technologies. Without guaranteed protection, emerging technologies will have difficulty
obtaining financing, potentially stifling innovation in the field. If people still chose to innovate
without patent protection, they must rely on trade secret protection instead.183 Unfortunately,
“rather than promoting information exchange and technological innovation, trade secrecy
encourages developers to hoard their inventions; this forces software developers to ‘spend much
of their efforts reinventing the wheel . . . .’”184
Since only inventions that are protectable are incentivized,185 providing state incentives would
encourage innovation and disclosure in breakthrough technologies. Justice Burger echoed this
sentiment in Goldstein v. California.186 There, Justice Burger noted the historical local character
of patents in the colonial period and under the Articles of Confederation, remarking that “the
patents granted by the States in the 18th century show … a willingness on the part of the States
to promote those portions of science and the arts which were of local importance.”187 He
referenced a 1751 Massachusetts patent for a process for the manufacture of candles out of whale
oil; a 1780 Pennsylvania patent for the processing of tanning oil and blubber; a 1786 South
Carolina patent for waterworks which aided in the production of rice, a staple of South Carolina
agriculture; a 1787 Maryland patent for a spinning and carding machine “to encourage useful
inventions, as well as promote the manufacture of cotton and wool within this state . . .”; and a
1787 Pennsylvania patent for a flour mill device that would “tend to simplify and render cheap
the manufacture of flour which is one of the principal staples of this commonwealth. . . .”188
Given the effect of state patent rights in the past, creating a new system of state patent rights
would be a return to the system under the Articles of Confederation - with the same problems
faced under the Articles.
B. Incentives for State Action
The Supreme Court’s statutory subject matter exception has arguably delayed the development
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of the software, biotech, and nanotechnology industries.189 Patents, by design, inhibit
competition and thereby give the inventor the opportunity to raise prices during the term of the
patent. This enhanced revenue opportunity incentivizes investing in unproven technology.
Rational investors factor in the possibility of greater revenue when evaluating the desirability of
investing in new research. Without the possibility of greater revenue, the attractiveness of the
risk/reward ratio is reduced, thus reducing the availability of funding to develop the technology.
Therefore, the exemptions, by depriving inventors of protection against competition, remove
incentives for inventing in these fields, perhaps even to the point of preventing promising new
technologies from ever developing.
The states are in a position to provide this missing incentive by providing protection for this
previously unprotected subject matter. However, the state-level solution would not be as
desirable as a federal solution. In effect, state-by-state patent rights would represent a return to
the Articles of Confederation, with all of the attendant problems.
Since state laws are inherently limited to activity within their state, a system resembling that
present under the Articles of Confederation would encourage state competition and
fragmentation of the national market. For example, if a state adopted the full federal catalog of
patent rights, they would risk discouraging manufacturing within the state.
Indeed, under the Articles, there was no consensus among the states. At least one state had a
general patent statute,190 two others had an intellectual property statute broad enough to cover
both copyrights and patents,191 while two others prohibited patents.192 Ideally, there would be a
consortium of states with common statutes and reciprocity. This would provide the advantages
that would flow from amending the U.S. patent statute and harmonizing it with international
norms of predictability and uniformity of processes.193 However, the creation of such a uniform
system would face challenges. For example, some states have large biotech industries and might
therefore be inclined to favor extending protection for that industry, while other states have small
biotech presence but large medical institutions which, as consumers of the innovation, might
argue for less protection.
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States could charge a fee for processing patent applications. The resulting potential revenue
would need to be balanced against possible harm to the state economy. Certain states could,
however, benefit from granting state patent rights tailored to the specific state’s economy by
providing, for example, exclusive rights to use an invention in the state, or the right to sell in the
state.
At least two categories of states could make a state-by-state patent system work. States with
large economies (for example, California, New York, and Texas) would have the economic
power, by virtue of the size of their markets, to impose this type of restriction without the risk of
manufacturers boycotting the state. States with unique, unmovable resources (for example, Johns
Hopkins in Maryland) could also impose these restrictions because of the enormous cost of
relocating the resources.
C. Designing a Constitutional State Patent System
States wanting to create their own patent systems would face inherent constraints. The systems
could, of course, only apply to activities within the state. They could, however, cover not only
manufacture within the state, but also use or sale within the state, much as the federal patent
statute covers patented inventions manufactured outside the United States but imported into,
used or sold within the United States.194
State systems could only cover inventions that the Constitution did not commit to federal
jurisdiction – those excluded from statutory subject matter by the Supreme Court’s exceptions.195
To avoid preemption issues, the state systems should be compatible with the federal
constitutional objectives of motivating innovation and disclosure.196 A safe course would be to
track the federal system by using a limited patent term (although the constitutional restriction to
limited terms applies only to Congress, not to the states) and a patent application examination
system assuring that state patents are only awarded for truly innovative discoveries.
The federal patent statute creates several patentability hurdles. To be patentable the invention
must fall within the categories of patentable subject matter,197 and the invention must be
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useful,198 novel,199 and nonobvious.200 The applicant for a patent must supply a written
description of the invention sufficient to teach others how to make and use it.201 These
requirements should be incorporated in a state system because they are sound policy and
desirable (if not necessary) to be consistent with the federal scheme and therefore lawful under
the Supremacy Clause.202
CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that the framers left virtually no record of deliberations concerning the
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution.203 Surely they knew how invention fueled the
success of England’s industrial revolution, and the framers must have realized the limited
resources available to the nation. It would certainly be helpful to know if the framers thought
that, given the importance of incentivizing innovation, the power to grant copyrights and patents
should be exclusively a federal power; or, given the limited resources available to the federal
government (and the far more pressing demands on those resources than providing incentives for
innovation), it would be helpful to know if the framers thought that state incentives were a
valuable tool to be used alongside federal incentives.
Judging solely by the written record, it is likely that they did not consider the question directly.
Without any evidence, one is left to look for inferential clues. The first clue is the lack of records
itself. If protection of intellectual property were thought essential to the success of the federal
government, one would expect that there would be more robust record of discussions concerning
the Intellectual Property Clause. A second clue is co-existence, because for much of the nation’s
history, state common law copyrights existed alongside federal copyrights.204 This shows a lack
of concern over shared control of copyrights, and since the power to grant copyrights and patents
arises under the same clause of the Constitution, it is reasonable to conclude that shared control
could apply to patents as well. A third clue is the existence of state patents under the Articles of
Confederation (and before), and the Tenth Amendment reservation of state powers not granted to
the federal government.205
It is fair to ask why, if the states had the power, none have exercised it to date. One explanation
would be that to the extent that the federal statute provides adequate incentive to innovate, there
is no need for states to intrude. This would have been a reasonable explanation until the
emergence of the “too much protection” theory which developed from the dissent in
198
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Metabolite.206
It is the emergence, and subsequent adoption, of the Metabolite theory, that grants the state
power to issue patents and creates the need for the exercise of such power. The theory itself –
that “too much protection” interferes with progress – certainly has the ring of truth. It ignores,
however, the fundamental observation that “[a]n inventor deprives the public of nothing which it
enjoyed before his discovery . . . .”207 Thus even a broad discovery that preempts a broad field
for a limited period of time does not necessarily inhibit progress, since there is no way to know
whether the field would even exist absent the broad discovery, nor can the importance of the
field be assessed except in hindsight.
The Supreme Court has ruled that certain categories of invention cannot be patented at the
federal level, but has provided no reason to believe that progress in those fields will not suffer for
lack of incentive. The states are in a position, by virtue of the exclusions created by the Supreme
Court, to supply incentives which the federal government cannot.
To be sure, the states are constrained in the design of such incentive systems,208 but it is possible
to design incentive systems within those constraints.209 Not all states have equal ability to
participate, but the states nonetheless have an opportunity to contribute to the continued
“Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
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